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I. Introduction
A. The Problem and its Origin
This report addresses the question of the benefits to be derived 1)y
the U.S. from improvements in our global grain crop forecasting capability
and of how these benefits would be distributed. Improvements in forecasting
grain crops in some countries may depend heavily on satellite technology
because timely information on crap conditions is not published by these
nations and the ability of foreigners to observe crop conditions first-hand
is restricted.
The importance of having a better grain production forecasting capabil-
ity on a global scale was emphasized by the series of poor world grain crops
between 1972 anti 1977 and the consequent instability in world grain pxxces.
The problem was especially troublesome in large grain producing and con-
suming countries, such as the USSR and the FRC, where the ahi,li.ty of people
from outside these countries to observe crop conditions directly k;-nd.
frequently was and still, is severely limited. As long as the U.S. capability
to observe crop conditions ,first-hand is limited, there will be great
interest in basting crop forecasting on satellite technology. 'However,
interest in this technology way extend even to countries where information
on crops is more comprehensive because improved satellite technology may
help achieve more accurate and timely production estimates by supplementing
current methods.
3r
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k	 In recent years, considerable progress has been made in demonstrating
the social value of more accurate information about crop production. The
pioneering work of Nayami and Peterson' /
 presented a theoretical and
empirical basks for measuring the socially optimum level of expenditures
on crop forecasting, for a given level of forecasting technology. Their
analysis is based on the total welfare gains of producers and consumers,
but it neglects storage costs of maintaining inventories.
More recently, BLadford and Kelejian2/ extended the work of Nayami
and Peterson. Their 4.alysis permits the calculation of separate berefits
to producers, consumers, and inventory holders in terms of consumers'
surplus, inventory holders' profits, frmers' receipts, and storagein-
dustry surplus (rents). This study and an analysis by Andrews3/
 have been
used by NASA in estimating the net benefits of Improving crop estimation
g
through the use of better satellite technol,ogy.4/
The NASA analysis assumes that 'no tariffs or trade restraints exist
and that there is free trade in grains.!/ As will be seen shortly, trade
barriers, together with other policy Factors, make it difficult to directly
link changes in production-consumption balances to trade levels.
Another problem with the welfare analyses is that they present gains
or losses for large groups of people -- e.g. producers or consumers. While
these measures are valid, they shed little light on how people within these
groups can be affected differently during a given period of time, how
popular perceptions of benefits or losses may differ from those derived
from theory, and how the interests of various groups manifest themselves
pressures for or against political action.
it with that used by USDA in its estimates of world production.
J
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An example will illustrate the practical nature of some of these
difficulties. Tito timing and accuracy of information affects tile behavior
of market prices over time. In tile summer of 1972 when the USSR began to
make large wheat purchases, the market was not generally aware of tho
magnitude of these purchases. Wheat producers who sold their wheat early
in the marketing season received relatively low prices. When the USSR's
buying intentions became more widely known, wheat prices rose sharply and
producers who sold litter in the season benefited greatly from the y higher
prices. The demand for "political action" did not come from all wheat
producers. Rather, it emanated from those who sold their wheat early
and cheaply. Thus, while wheat producers as a whole benefited from
higher prices in the 1972-73 marketiog season, $; was virtually impossible
to convince those who sold early of this benefit.
B. Study Objectives and Approach
The basic objective of this study is to analyze the benefits that
would flow to various groups from a specified degree of improvement in
forecasting grain production. The improvements in forecasting accuracy
would come from tile use of satellite technology in conjunction with
existing ground-based estimating procedures. The degree of forecasting
accuracy to be obtained from satellite technology has been specified by
NASA and employed in this study.
Tile study focuses on wheat production in seven countries/rogioas:
the United States; Canada; Australia; Argentina; Western Europe; tile USSR;
and all other countries as a group. This country/region breakdown Is
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While the primary focus is on wheat, some attention is also given to
other grains, particularly when they are substitutes for wheat. In many
regions of the world, wheat and o ►-her grains are substitutes in both
human consumption and animal feeding. In addition, factors affecting
wheat production may also affect production of other grains. For these
reasons, an analysis of forecasting accurac; for wheat production has to
recognize the supply-demand balance for other grains as well.
This analysis is retrospective in nature. We assume that an improved
production forecasting technology was in place prior to 1972 and that its
capabilities were generally recognized. We thus describe how the new
forecasting technology would have improved available information during
the 1972-77 period, recognizing that the information systems actually used
were improved during this period. The assumed improvement in information
will be analyzed with respect to its Impact on market price behavior,
prices received by producers and paid by consumers, trade flows, and
government policy decisions.
Section II of this report discusses the nature of the world trade in
grains. The operation of the private international grain trade is covered
in Section 111. The flow and utilization of information during the 1973-77
period is described in Section IV. Sections V and VI analyze the impact
of an Improved information system. The last section deals with U.S.
policy implications of having and utilizing better crop forecasting
technology.
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II. Nature of World Grain Trade
This section of the report describes how government policies affect
P:
International trade in grains and describes the major exporting and
importing countries and their grain marketing systems. The discussion
1	 provides a basis for judging the competitive mature of international trade
F
in grains.
A. Goveinment Intervention in Agriculture.
Governments in almost all countries are involved in one way or another
with agriculture through policy interventions, although these interventions
vary in nature And degree among countries. In the case of grains, they
range from nearly total government control of production, distribution,
and international trade (as in the USSR or the FEC) to policies aimed at
supporting farm prices and incomes but employing little government involve-
ment in internal or external trade (as in the United States or the
European Econdmic Community (EEC)). For purposes of thin study, general
agricultural policies are taken as given.
1 In most developed market economies, policy interventions are designed
to support farm prices or incomes above those that would prevail under
purely competitive market conditions. Similar policies are followed by
some developing countries for some commodities; but, more typically,
developing countries follow policies that keep the consumer price of food
low and depress farm prices below world market levels in the process.
These various policy interventions require trade restrictions of one
form or another. In cases where pioducer prices or incomes are supported,
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trade restrictions such as impart qutoas, tariffs, variable levies and
export subsidies are required. Where domestic prices are kept below world.
market levels, export taxes or stAbsidized prices resulting from excessive
Imports and a variety of domestic measures are employed.
Trade interventions other than tariffs can destabilize world market
prises. They Insulate countries from the world market to varying degrees
and prevent world price changes from fully influencing either production
or consumption in the protected countries. Not only do such policy inter-
ventions influence the level of world trade, but they make it difficult
to relate changes in production to changes In trade through the use of
any of the simple global free trade models..!/
Other forces also interfere with the link between production and
consumption in a country and its level of exports or imports. Many
developing countries and some centrally planned economies have foreign
exchange shor"ages and cannot fully meet their food import requirements,
especially in periods of .large production shortfals. In such times,
meeting domestic food deficits would require interruption of nonfood
imports, and some countries would rather maintain the level of industrial
imports and absorb temporary reductions in food supplies.
In other situations, the transportation, storage, and distribution
facilities are inadequate for countries to use imports to fully offset
declines in domestic production. This is especially true in many develop-
ing countries. For example, during the severe Sahelian drought of the
early 1970's, it was physically impossible to import all the needed food,
even though it was available to the region.
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Knowledge about the level of grain stocks and how they are managed
In many countries is very incomplete. This is eapecially true for Communist
countries that treat information about their stocks as a state secret for
national security reasons. While we know that the USSR and the PRC maintain
sizable grain reserves, the size of these reserves and how they are managed
remains obscure.
Finally, food exports from some countries may be dictated by factors
other than availabilities and world prices. In some situations, countries
may export grain for reasons of foreign policy, and these exports may bear
little relationship to supplies and prices. In other cases, the lack of
storage or the need for foreign exchange may result in export levels in
excess of those determined purely by market price prospects. And in still
other situations, the inability to physically move grain Into export may
reduce a country's exports below that indicated by world priiae levels
and domestic avai.labili.ties.
Government policies may be used in ways that introduce elements of
noncompetitive behavior in world markets, particularly in the longer-run.
Both McCalla and Taplirr- presented analyses to show that in the 1960's the
V.S. and Canada behaved as duopolists with the objective of maintaining
historic market shares. A degree of stability is added to the duopoly
behavior of the U.S. and Canada by their willingness to hold stocks in
times of large supplies. McCalla indicated in his analysis, which applied
primarily to the early 1960's, that Australia could become important if
its production increased and it, too, were willing to hold supplies off
the market in times of large production. This development has occurred
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to a large extent, and Alaouze, Watson, and Sturges-3/
 argue that the world wheats
market today can be categorized as having a triopoly structure.
Tito means of grain trade varies considerably among countries and
reflects government policies. In the Communist countries, international
grain trade is carried out by state monopolies; and in some developing
countries such as India, it is also handled by the Government. In most
other major, non-Communist grain importing countries, international trade
in grain is conducted by private firms. Such countries include those of
Western Europe and Japan in the case of coarse grains. .Japanese wheat
imports are handled by the Food Agency, a government monopoly.
Among the major grain exporters, only the United States has a system
totally dependent upon the private trade. Other exporting countries rely
to varying degrees on export monopolies.
In Canada, the Wheat Board monopolizes export sales of wheat
and coarse grains, although the private trade is involved to some extent
in executing these sales. The Australian Wheat Board has complete monopoly
power over wheat exports, and coarse grain exports are made by a combina-
tion of marketing boards and private firras. Until recently, grain export
sales from Argentina were made almost entirely by the Government; however,
private firms have become more directly involved in export sales in recent
years.
B. Major Exporting and Im2orting Countries
World trade in grain has grown rapidly since 1960, and partiularly
after 1970. based on the country/region groupings presented in Table 1,
world exports of wheat increased by 71 percent between 1960 and 1977, or
k ow
	
^W
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by 3.2 percent a year. However, there have been large annual variations
about the growth trend. For coarse grains, world exports increased by
322 percent, or by 8.8 percent a year between 11910 and 1977, as shown in
Table 2. The annual growth rate between 1960 and 1970 was 7.7 percent,
compared to 10.9 percent for the 1970-77 period.
The growth in wheat trade reflects an increase in food demand that
has been growing most rapidly in the devloping countries with high rates of
population growth. The growth in coarse grain trade reflects rapidly
growing demand for livestock production in the developed countries, the
USSR, Eastern Europe, and the high-income developing countries.
The U.S,, is the major wheat exporter, followed 'by Canada, Australia,
and Argentina. In 1977, the U.S. supplied 53 percent of total world wheat
exports, about the same shax b it :ad in 1960. The developing countries
experitnecd high rates of growth in imports. In 1960 these countries
accounted, for 32 percent of world imports, but by 1977 they ,accounted for
51 percent of total world imports. In recent years the PRC, the USSR, and
Eastern Europe have also become major wheat importers.
The U.S. is the dominant exporter of coarse grains. Its share of
world exports grew from 57 to 71 percent between 1960 and 1977. Argentina
is the next largest exporter, but its exports in 1977 were only one-fifth
the U.S. level,. The major importing regions are Western Europe, Japan,
and the USSR. European imports have been fairly steady in recent years,
while those for Japan and the USSR have trended upward.
i
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Table 1
Would Trade in Wheat
1960	 1965
	 1970	 1975	 1978
^- '- -
	 million metric tons - - -
Country/Region
U.S.A. -17.7 -23.6 -19.9 -31.6 -30.3
Canada - 9.3 -14.9 -11.5 -12.3 -16.3
W. Europe 11.5 5.2 7.8 - 3.1 0.6
Oceania 4.8 - 5.4 - 9.4 - 8.5 - 8.3
Japan 2.8 3.4 4.8 5.9 5.8
South Africa 0.1 0.2 0.2 (-) - 0.2
E. Europe 5.0 6.3 5.8 4.0 3.1
U.S.S.R. - 4.4 5.9 - 6.7 9.6 5.9
P.R.C. 1.9 6.3 3.6 C.2 8.6
Other Comm. 0.4 0.6 1.2 I.i 1.5
Argentina -	 1.9 - 7.9 -	 1.6 - 3.2 - 13
Brazil 2.0 2.3 1.8 3.8 3.6
Thailand 0.1 0.1 .2
South Asia 5.2 9.1 4.0 10.5 2.7
Low Inc.	 LDC's 3.7 6.3 8.6 11.3 14.1
Mid Inc. LDC's 1.9 ).3 3.1 2.9 3.3
Hi	 T im.	 LDC's 2.5 2.8 5.5 7.9 10.2
Total Exports 33.3 51.8 49.1 58.7 56.8
* (-) indicates less than 50,000 tons. Minus signs before
figures denote exports.
- 1.2
Table 2
4.
World Trade in Coarse Grains*
1960 1965 1970 1975 1978
- - i illion metric tons - - - - -
Country/Region
U.S.A. -10.6 -25.2 -19.1 -49.3 -55.8
Canada - 0.4 - 0.6 - 3.9 - 4.3 - 33.5
W, Europe 14.3 23.6 20.7 19.8 20.1
Oceania -	 1.1 - 0.4 - 2.2 - 3.7 - 1.8
Japan 1.9 5.2 10.5 13.5 17.0
South Africa - 1.1 - 0.4 -	 1.0 - 1.5 - 3.7
E. Europe 0.2 2.6 2.1 3.8 7.0
U.S.S.R. - 1.8 - 2.2 - 0.8 15.6 10.7
P.R.C. 0.7 - 0.2 (-) - 0.1 0.1
Other Comm. - 0.2 - 0.1 (-) - 0.1 - 0.2
Argentina - 2.6 - 3.8 - 7.6 - 7.1 -11.2
Brazil (-) - 0.6 - 1.9 - 1.5 -	 1,5°
Thailand - 0.5 -	 1.2 - 1.8 - 2.6 - 1.3
South Asia 0.2 1,2 - 0.7 0
Low Inc. LDC's 0.1 - 0.4 0.9 3.5 5.2
Mid Inc. LDC's - 0.4 - 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.5
Hi	 Inc.	 LDC's 0.4 0.4 2.2 5.6 8.4
Total Exports 18.7 35.5 38.3 70.1 79.0
* (-) indicates less than 50,000 tons. Minus Signs before
figures denote exports.
C. Export Marketing Aoards
Several of the large grain exporting countries, notably Canada and
Australia, utilize marketing boards. The operations of these boards are
discussed here.
Canada
The Canadian Wheat Board is a crown corporation and is the sole
export seller of wheat, barley, and oats, Canada's principal export
• grains. The Wheat Board ;negotiates the sale and shipment for most of
Canada's grain exports, although it also offers some of its grain to
private exporters each year for resale in the open market.AJ
 The Wheat
Board also implements some of Canada's agricultural policies.
A Minister of the Canadian Government maintains a continuous super-
visory role over Wheat Board activities, which are subject to question
and discussion in Parliament at any time. barge sales of grain, potential
crop failures, loss of potential sales by the Board, and related issues
are regularly reported and debated in Parliament.
While the Whb.at Board operates in ways consistent with overall
government policy, it has considerable latitude in exercising its export
role. It can enter into multi-year sales agreements and has done so with
countries like the USSR and the PRC. Since the terms of sales are treated
r as confidential and not made public, the Board has substantial flexibility
in setting export prices for individual sales and in meeting competition
from other exporting countries. The results for each marketing season
are reported, but they represent an average for all sales made during the
season and do not provide details on individual transactions.
w
A-
Australia
The Australian Wheat Board, operating as an export, ,., pnopoly, is the,
only authorized receiver and seller of wheat. Tho Board is a statutory
corporation with 10 representatives of wheat growers on the Board and four
representatives appointed by the Minister of Primary Industries (Agr,i.culture).Y
The Australian wheat Board operates its wheat export activities in
much the same way as its Canadian counterpart. Terms of individual sales
are not made public, and it can and has entered into long-term sales agree-
ments with importing countries. It is able to set export prices on individ-
ual sales at or below prevailing world market prices to assure export
movement of wheat.
i$arley is the other major export grain in Australia. Sales of barley
are handled by state marketing boards in Western Australia, New South
Wales, Queensland and combined board for South Australia and Victoria known
as the Australian Marketing Board. The latter handles most of Australia's
barley exports.-
6/
As with wheat, the Boards are free to set export prices. This
provides the Boards with authority to remain competitive in world markets
and to ensure exports of available supplies.
D. Government Import Monopolies
All of the Communist countries utilize state trading corporations to
handle both grain imports and exports. Although some other countries
have state trading agencic8 for selected imports (the Japanese Food
Agency handles all wheat import--, and several government agencies in India
s	 ,,
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Are involved in grain imports and exports), the Soviet system Is described
here because it is characteristic of how grain trade is handled In Com-
munist countries.
The USSR"s state trading corporation, Exportkhleb, is the sole exporter
and importer of agricultural products. Exportkhleb Is under the general
supervision of the Ministry of Trade; it operates, under its own unique
regulations, in somewhat the same fashion in respect to the government
as the Canadian Wbeat Board operates in respect to the Canadian government.
Bath are semi.-autonomous corporate entities, carrying out business opera-
tions. In the Canadian case, the Wheat Board is semi-independent, and it
is an exporter only, endeavoring to maximize returns to the producers who
have supplied the grain and to achieve national economic and political
objectives.
Exportkhleb, on the other hand, imports and exports at the direction
of and for the account of the State, implementing decisions made by the
government. In recent years, this agency has become predominantly an
importer of grains and soybeans, but it continues to export sunflower oil,
some grain, and other agricultural products.
The importance of state trading agencies in Communist countries
arises from the way they buy or sell grain. They negotiate directly with
exporters, whether they are private companies or export boards, and the
negotiations are conducted in secret and on a bilateral basis. The; state
trading agency accepts what it thinks are the best offers available, and
they typically do not indicate in advance what their import requirements
will be. In contrast, other state agencies such as the Japanese Food
-1b-
Agency and the grain buying agencies in India buy on a competitive bidding basis,
and the quantities purchased and the prices paid are usually openly
available to the market.
E. Private Grain Trade
.'	 The private grain trade accounts for a large part of world grain
'
	
	 trade. Although data on global trade handled by the private sector are
not available, some rough orders of magnitude can be obtained.
Estimating the size of private grain trade is difficult because dif-
ferent organizations are involved: private exporters sell to private
importers and state trading organizations; and marketing boards may sell
to private exporters, private importers, and state trading organizations
'
	
	
that are importers. To simplify this analysis, exporters and importers
are examined separately.
The U.S. is the largest grain exporter. In recent years, the U.S.
accounted for over 50 percent of world exports of wheat and about 70
percc.it of coarse grains exports. Virtually all a%ports are handled by
the private trade. The breakdown of U.S. exports by firm are presented
in Table 3 for 1971 and 1975. In 1975, the top six exporters accounted
for 82 percent of total U.S. grain exports, with the top three firms
handling 53 percent. One of the leading exporters, Cook Industries went
out of business in 1978, leading to further concentration of exports.
On the other hand, some cooperatives and small private exporters have
increased their volume of exports, although we do not know if their
relative importance has increased.
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Table 3
Percent of U.S. Grain Ex2or.is by Firm
FY 1971	 FY 1975
Cargill 28 19
Continental 21 17
Cook Industries 16 17
Louis Dreyfus Corp. 7 13
Donge Corp. 8 8
Carnac Grain Co. 6 8
Toept'er 0 5
ADM z z
Peavey 0 2
The Andersons 1 1
Early & Daniels InI. 0 1
Central Soya 0 1
Other 11 6
100 100
.Source: Kenneth Towl, Cargill Inc.: Managing Corporate Public Policy
in a Changing External Environment (Boston: Intercollegiate Case
Clearing House, 1977) .
t,
is _
All of the leading U.S. exporters operate on a worldwide basis,
exporting grain from many other countries as well. Thus, in terms of
volume handled, these companies are larger than indicated by the volume
of U.S. grain exports.
The private trade handles a large portion of the grain exports from
several other major grain cxportirog countries, including Argentina, South
Africa, Thailand, Western Europe, and several smaller exporting countries.
As already mentioned, the Canadian Wheat Board also sells some of its
grain to the private trade.
We estimate that private firms handle well over 50 percent of world
wheat exports and 70 percent or more of coarse grain exports. The private
trade is somewhat less dominant on the import side because of the role of
state trading agencies in the Communist countries and in some other nations.
Western Europe is one of the largest grain importing regions and
most of this region's imports are handled by the pr$.vate grain trade. In
Japan, importation of coarse grains is carried out by the private trade,
and private firms play an important role in handling grain imports in
many other countries as well.
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III. Private International Grain Trade
A. U.S. Firms and Foreign Subsidiaries
The private sector concerned with international trade in grains is
very diverse. There are four or five large firms that operate on a
global basis and buy from or sell to a large number of countries. While
these firms have national identities in a legal sense, they are truly
multinational operations. In addition, there are large numbers of
smaller private firms that are almost exclusively importers or exporters
in the countries in which they are based. While some cf these firms may
be fairly large in terms of the imports or exports of their own country,
they are small in relation to the total volume of world trade.
Concern over the concentration in grain exports and the possibility
of monopoly power in grain pricing is frequently expressed. Concentra-
tion in the grain trade does exist because there are few exporting
countries and because a small number of private firms account for a
large part of U.S. exports and total world trade.
With respect to wheat exporting countries, the case has been made
that they behave as if each exporter could exercise some degree of mono-
poly power. This power grows out of the use of national policy measures
to influence the country's position in world markets. In the past,
major wheat exporters such as the U.S. and Canada have us(yd export sub-
sidies, export credits, and food aid programs to counter competition
from other countries and to maintain their shares of the world market.
If one country's share of the market increases, a major competitor
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will take steps to regain its lost share.
But within the framework of government policies aimed at main-
taining market shares, world trade in wheat and other, grains is generally
competitive. In the U.S., there is a high degree of concentration in
the grain export business (Table 3 ), yet the markets for grains appear
to have all the elements of a competitive Industry:
- Large numbers of sellers and buyers (domestic and export);
- Homogeneous products;
A fairly large number of small export firms competing
with a relatively few large exporters; and
- Highly competitive futures market.
The existence of concentration in the grain export business, how-
ever, needs to be examined in tte context of the competitive elements
in grain markets. Caves argues that this concentration can be explained
by the economies of scale related to information required to conduct
international trade. He points out that:
Information is a fixed cost that can be spread over varying
amounts of transactions, and information about trading loca-
tions is subject to increasing returns in the trading possi-
bilities that it reveals. Also, the perishability of infor-
mation creates scale economies to the maintenance of a con-
l/
tinuous trading presence.^
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Scale economies in information are reinforced by similar economies
in tran ►sporation and key storage facilities. These economies permit
2/
risk-pooling within a firm.
The major grain trading firms operate extensive global information
and research systems that are strictly proprietary in nature. By most
standards, these activities are large and efficient in the sense of
providing management with timely information about crop prospects and
trade opportunities. It is important that they have information about
production and trade prospects before it is available to the general
public in order to gain a degree of market advantage over competitors.
Therefore, they devote considerable resources to gathering and analyzing
information before it is made available by governments and internatioxial
organizations.
All of the large firms have their own meterological staffs which
monitor world weather conditions. Information on temperature, precip-
itation, and other meteorological factors are gathered and analyzed on
a daily basis. This weather information is relayed to staff agronomists
who are familiar with weather-crop production interrelationships in each
major grain producing area of the world. Some firms also employ yield
forecasting models which relate weather factors to yield prospects.
Together with information about planted and harvested area, this yield
information provides a basis for making timely grain production esti-
mates.
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The large grain trading firms also have offices and staff in many
countries, and their personnel are able to make ,first-hand observations
about crop conditions which enables verification of information obtained
from other sources. These same people also work closely with natioo.al
governments and the private sector in many countries, preparing supply-
demand balances for these countries and relating this Information to
export availabilities or Import needs. The global information Is analyzed
at "headquarters" and assessments of trade and price prospects are made
there.
The large private firms also have foreign subsidiaries in addition
to their operating offices in other countries. The two large U.S. grain
trading firms -- Cargill and Continental -- have foreign subsidiaries in
Geneva, Bunge and Dreyfus are non-U.S *
 companies with large operations in
the U.S. The foreign operations of the large trading farms have consi-
derable operating autonomy; but, of course, the parent firm is kept fully
appraised of their operations.
The use of foreign subsidiaries by U.S. exporters became important
after the large growth in U.S. trade with the Communist bloc countries,
particularly Russia, after 1972. Foreign subsidiaries apparently became
an important vehicle for negotiating sales with Communist countries while
keeping such information secret for a period of time. Communint state
trading organizations evidentl y .pant to keep their purchases secret in
order to be able to buy at the most favorable prices. Secrecy also
enables exporters to coyer their sales before they are publically announced.
Under the export reporting system, to be discussed later, a U.S. company
x
Y
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does not have to report sales of foreign subsidiaries until these sales
3/
are formally transferred to the U.S. 'parent fins.
B. Operation of the Private 'Trade
The business relationships among private firms in those countries
where the private trade is important are cond.ateu through competitive
market practices. Both cash and futures markets are used to make sakes
and purchases. Buyers and sellers make their transactions on the basis
of competitive bids, and these transactions are known in the market.
Even purchases by some foreign governments or their designated public
agencies are made on a,competitive bidding basis, e.g., P.L. 480 sales,
wheat sales to the Japan food Agency, and many others.
U.S. futures markets are used by manly foreign governments and foreign
private firms to hedge purchases or sales of commodities of non-U.S.
origin. Some countries use U.S. futures prices tolrice sales or purchases
even though they do not use the futures market directly. For example,
Thailand's corn exports to ,Japan are priced on the basis of a formula
which relies on futures prices for corn in Chicago.
C. Government Trade Monopolies
Government trade monopolies sell to both private and government im-
porters. With respect to the latter group of buyers, sales can be
individual transactions or part of long-term sales agreements. A dis
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tinguishing characteristic of exports by trade monopolies to similar
Importing institutions is that the prices are rarely made public. This
gives the export monopoly the ability to effectively compete on price,
even to the point of selling below open market prices at times. In this
way, export monopolies can have a competitive advantage over private
firms. However, the prices received from sales to private exporters or
importers are usually known to the market.
Export monopolies do not have to reveal when sales are made. It is
usually known when these exporters have discussions with import mono-
polies, but it is not necessarily known when sales are actually made.
However, export monopolies are agents for producers and it is usually
in their interest to announce sales soon after they occur.
`:
	
	
Import monopolies such as the Russia's Exportkhleb are the sole
buying agents for their country. Typically, they do not buy openly in
the market; rather, they arrange for imports from either export monopolies
or private firms on the basis of negotiated prices. The import monopoly,
however, observes open market prices and the prices they negotiate with
exporters are fully competitive.
The import monopoly has a financial interest in not immediately re-
vealing individual purchases, and may it not wish to reveal total purchase
intentions. Commonly, they request (insist) that exporters, whether
private firms or export monopolies, not reveal sales for some time so as
not to bid up prices anymore than necessary. These practices can seriously
distort market prices for up to several months. If significant quantities
of grain have been sold but the information is withheld from the market,
the price effect of these sales will not be fully realized. Only when the
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sales are announced will nearly all of the market price impact be felt.
In the interim, both exporters and importers can gain a temporary market
price advantage.
In reality, even when sales are not formally announced, information
r	
is usually available through rumor or inference from the behavior of
exporters. However, this is a very imprecise way of ,fudging the size
I	 of sales.
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Grain Trading Industry, Discussion Paper No. 546, Harvard Institute
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IV. Information plows on Wheat Production
and Trade, 1972-73 through 1977-78
The period of instability in the world grain markets, which began
F i
	
	 n 1972, had a widespread impact both in terms of the availability and
cost of food supplies and in terms of confidence in the ability to
manage food supplies in the future. One of the more significant de-
velopments early in this period was the realization that serious defi-
ciencies existed in the collection and dissemination of information
regarding the supply and demand balance for wheat and other grains.
That is, while an improved information system could have done little
to alter the level of grain production worldwide, it might have allowed
more efficient management of available supplies. This probably could
have resulted in more stable, if not lower, prices.
The events of 1972--77 forced a re-evaluation of and refinements in the
global information system for grains. The collection and dissemination
of information on world wheat production and trade logically occurs
along two complimentary lines. In general, the flow of information
is in regard to either supply or demand for agricultural commodities.
While the U.S. has a long-established information system for domestic
wheat production (along with other agricultural commodities), no such
comprehensive system was in effect for the rest of the world in the
early 1970's.	 USDA did not start to make regular periodic assess-
ments of the world grain situation until 1973-74. The Soviet crop
shortfall of 1972 and the resulting massive grain purchases, followed
in subsequent years by events such as the failure of the Indian monsoon,
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Chinese crop shortfalls and the Sahellan drought, all had a major impact
on demand Zor U.S. grains. This ,further emphasized the need for a
comprehensive and regular review of world productiot. and demand prospects
for grain, particularly wheat.
Related to assessments of the supply-demand outlook is the avail-
ability of actual data on the level of purchases of U.S. grains by the
rest of the world. USDA began publishing data on U.S. grain sales in
197 !x. following action by Congress. Prior to that time, current informa-
tion on export sales was unavailable. Information on the current rate
of actual grain shipments was available, but this gave nc reliableindi-
cation of future export demand patterns. Consequently, improvements in
the global grain information system primarily were in response to events
beginning in 1972. There is no question that the flow of relevant infor-
mation has improved since then, or that it could be refined further. This
chapter summarizes the flow of information affecting the world grain
balance during the 1972-77 period.
A. Background
In the early 1970's, a series of events began to exert a major in-
fluence on the world food supply-demand balance. These events, beginning
in 1972 with the decline in world grain production and purchases of U.S.
grain by the Soviet Union, were almost universally uiianticipated. The
result was an extended period of instability in food supplies and agri-
cultural prices.
In order to fully appreciate the instability of the 1972-77 period
it is useful to contrast it with the previous decade. In earlier years,
t
	 I
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the world had experienced an extended period of beneficial weather for
crop production. Crop failures certainly had occurred, but typically
a
E	
were isolated^ geographically in any given year. Also, declines in USSR
grain production were absorbed for the most part by reduced consumption
rather than increased imports. The global decline in food production in
1972 was the first in two decades. Only two years later another decline
in grain production was experienced.
Prior to the 1970's, signi ficant advances in crop yields had been
achieved through genetic improvements and increased use of chemical fer-
tilizers and other inputs. However, by the end of the 1960's, the rate
of increase in crop yields had begun to slow. Consequently, the produc-
tion setbacks of the 1970's coincided with an apparent reduction in the
advancement of crop production technology.
Prior to 1972, chronic grain surpluses were the norm in the devel-
oped countries. Production tended to exceed demand at prices supported
through government programs. Surplus production potential resulted in
either large stocks of grain or acreage withheld from production. Food
production gains in the developing countries was mixed; however, a signi-
ficant part of their growing food needs typically was met through transfers
of food on concessional terms from the surplus producing developed coun-
tries.
The food and agricultural sectors of the centrally planned countries
were isolated from world markets to a large degree in this earlier period.
Trade in grains was marginal. Centralized control allowed domestic demand
to be adjusted to available supplies. Significant production shortfalls
-- 31
did result in expander' import requirements, but major adjustments typically
occurred within the domestic economies, not on world markets. Moreover,
the grain import needs of the two largest countries--the USSR and China
had been met front non-U.S. sources. Thus, the iv itial purchases of U.S.
grain by the Soviet Union and Chinn were unusual, both in their occurrence
and their magnitude. As a result, the fluctuations in world food produc-
tion, the large surge in grain trade, and the sharp depletion of grain
4
	 stocks which occurred in the mid-1970's were to a large extent outside the
realm of experience of the previous decade.
B. Chronology of Information Flow
1972
At the start of 1972, the world wheat situation was still perceived
to be one of surplus, The previous U.S. wheat crop , had achieved record
yields and production. World wheat production during the July 1971-June
1972 marketing year was also at record levels. Beginning stocks of wheat
of the major exporters in 1971-72 had fallen from the high level of the
previous crop year, but were expected to rise over 10 percent by the start
of the next season. World wheat trade if. 1971-72 was expected to decline
as a result of improved production in most importing regions.
The U.S. harvest in the fall of 1971 had recovered from the 1970
corn blight and reached a record far surpassing previous levels of pro-
duction. Similarly, total world coarse grain production for 1971-72 had
risen, and growing stocks were expected.
Thus, at the end of Calendar 1971, the available information on the
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general outlook for the world grain balance again pointed toward surpluses,
However, at the beginning of 1972 certain .factors existed that would
have a significant impact on the level of demand for grain over the next
year and beyond. These factors were generally known, but at that time
they were perceived more as developments which would tend to Delp alleviate
the apparent surplus supply outlook rather than produce a drastic rever-
sal in the world grain situation.
Among the economic measures taken by the U.S. government in the last
half of 1971 was the devaluation of the dollar. In effect, the cost to
foreign consumers of 'U.S.  agricultural commodities was reduced. Never-
thelesn, bumper crops and the slowdown in foreign economic growth presaged
li.ttled immediate improvement in U.S. grain exports, and efforts were made
to boost U.S. agricultural trade. This included initiatives aimed at
East-West trade, particularly with the Soviet Union. A long-standing re-
quirement that half of any U.S. exports of grain to the USSR and Eastern
Europe had to be transported by U.S. flag vessels was lifted. As a result,
;gin November 1971 the Soviet Union purchased $125 million (about 3 million
metric tons) of U.S. feed grains -- the first since. 1964. In addition,
foreign policy initiatives towards the Peoples Republic of China begun in
1971 increased the potential of future grain trade with that country.
In summary, by the start of 1972, there were indications of new demand.
Information regarding abundant grain supplies appears to have been the
overriding factor, however, as evidenced by the market prices for grains
in the last half of 1971 and first half of 1972. In view of this assess-
ment, the U.S. government policy reaction was to continue to restrict do-
a
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mastic production while promoting efforts to expand exports.
The first indications of a changing grain supply picture began to
emerge in early February 1972, when the U.S. agricultural attA ghe in
Moscow reported extensive damage to the Soviet winter grain crop. This
raised the possibility that the USSR might tinter world markets to buy
sizable quantities of feed grains later in the year if production failed
to meet targets. The occurrence of greater than usual winterkill was
confirmed shortly thereafter by Izvestia. Also during February, the
USSR negotiated a contract with the Canadian W%eat Board for the pur-
chase of between 3.5 and 5.0 mmt of wheat for delivery by 1974.
During the winter and early spring of 1972, policy considerations
within the U.S. government centered on approaches to foster Soviet pur-
chases of U.S. grains. While the unquantified reports of potential
USSR crop losses in 1972 indicated the probability of significant pur-
chases, the principal focus of U.S. policy concerns appeared to be upon
the means. for, and domestic benefits of, expanding exports to the USSR
rather than , upon assessment of the potential destabilizing impact of a
huge increase in Soviet imports.
This feeling continued through the spring of 1972 and was supported
by the flat to declining trend of wheat prices during the period. Typi-
cally, heavy damage to Soviet winter grains had been largely offset by
increased planting of spring grains. Information generally available to
the world grain markets and policymakers tended to indicate a repetition
of this historical, pattern. However, in late Parch and in April, addi-
tional reports confirmed that winterkill had been extensive and that
l
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conditions for spring plantings were unfavorable. Not only would vouch
of the winter grain losses not be recovered, but serious problems appeared
to be limiting the potential for spring sown crops.
During May and June, high level negotiations on grain sales were
conducted at the summit meeting in Moscow and were followed by further
talks in Washington. These resulted in the announcement in early July
1972 of the Soviet agreement to purchase a minimum of $750 million of
grain over the next three years. However, by that time the Soviets
had already purchased 4.0 mmt of wheat and 4.5 mot of corn valued at
nearly $500 million. By mid-August Soviet purchases totaled 11.8 mmt of
wheat and 6.3 mmt of corn, and USDA did not appear to be aware of these
large sales as they were being made by exporti;g firms. In addition
to the purchases of U.S. grain, the USSR also exercised its option to
purchase 1.5 mint of Canadian wheat (adding to the 3.5 mmt bought the
previous spring) and purchased 1.0 mmt of Australian wheat for delivery
during September 1972 through May 1973.
As can be seen from the table on page 61, s=mear prices rose sharply
after July, reaching a peak in December 1972 that was nearly 80 percent
above the harvest low prices in July. The "unexpectedly" large USSR
purchases and the subsequent Price increases generated considerable
political pressure from wheat producers in the Southern Plain States who
had sold a significant portion of their crop at harvest time. they had
missed the benefits of the sharp price rise.
The initial comprehensive review of world wheat production by USDA
in the fall (October) of 1972 was fairly close to the final estimate.
However, the assessment of the world grain balance at the end of 1972
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was considerably different than the outlook at the start of the year.
In addition to the decline of 12 mmt in USSR wheat production, indica-
tions of grain production shortfalls (as yet unquantified) were appearing
in other countries. India experienced a failure of its monsoon, and
the rice crop declined sharply. The Chinese grain crop reportedly was
lower than the previous year. Finally, the Australian wheat crop was
suffering from a drought.
1973
The sharp rise in grain prices in the last half of 1972 caused
public concern over escalating food costs. In response to these pres-
sures, the USDA relaxed acreage restrictions for 1973 crops, but it did
not remove them completely.
I
	
	
The periodic assessments of prospective developments in the world
grain balance began in the spring of 1973 with USDA's first projection
of 1973-74 world grain production. For wheat, the initial outlook (re-
leased in April 1973) for the 1973-74 crop was for a substantial increase
in production, reduced international trade, and rising stocks by the end
of the 1973-74 season. This assessment of recovery from the shocks of
late 1972 brought lower prices in the first halt: of the year. U.S.
wheat prices (farm level) declined from a high of $2.38/bu. in January 1973
to $2.15/bu. in May.
The initial forecast for improved wheat production in 1973-74 was
based primarily on expansion of plantings in several major producing
countries and an assumption of normal weather. Large increases were
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forecast for the wheat crops in Australia, Canada and the U.S. Below
normal moisture conditions were noted in Canaria, China, North Africa
and the Middle East.
However, by mid-1973, prospects had shifted again towards a righter
world wheat balance. While world production prospects improved slightly,
increased consumption and expanded trade were forecast to result in
another decline in stock levels, In its August 1973 assessment, USDA
still forecast sharp increases in production for the U.S., USSR, Canada,
and Australia. However, Argentine wheat was seriously hampered at
planting time by wet weather, and Argentina was expected to harvest a
crop one-fourth smaller than the year before. On balance, the rest of
the world laced the prospect of small reductions in output.
This shift in outlook was associated with another round of rising
prices, which began in July of 1973 and peaked at $5.25 per bu. in
February 1974. Even though world wheat production forecasts were re-
vised upward again in October and December, export demand remained at
a high level. Countries that had experienced reduced prnducti.on earlier
rebuilt stocks, and other countries made large purchases as protection
against future shortages.. It became apparent early in the 1973-74 mar-
keting year that U.S. wheat stocks would be further depleted as a result
of the strong export demand. (In fact, ending 1973-74 stocks reached
340 mil. bu., compared to 597 mil. bu. the year earlier and 983 mil. bu.
at the end of 1971-72.)
Increased production of wheat and other grains in 1973-74 was not
sufficient to compensate for the crop shortfall the year before and for
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the expanded currant season demand} Another factor, which exacerbated
the grain situation, was the extremely tight supply-demand balance in
the soybean complex which developed in 1973. Unanticipated purchases
by the USSR and China, the failure of the Peruvian anchovy fishery in
late 1972, and rising demand for high protein food in livestock produc-
tion resulted in unsustainable levels of demand and extremely high prices.
Consequently, the U.S, was forced to take the unprecedented step of
placing an embargo on soybean exports in June 1973. Two impacts were
felt in the world grain markets. First, the high costs of protein feeds
in livestock production increased demand for grains as ac ► alternative
source of protein. More importantly, the shock of the soybean embargo
was to affect commodity markets for a number of years. The fear of
shortages and possible future U.S. government restrictions on exports
generated protective and speculative buying in excess of current needs.
1974
Two policy decisions were made in 1974. Both were a direct result
of the instability in grain markets over the two past crop years.
First, land previously withheld from grain production under government
programs was allowed to come back into production for the 1974 crops.
This action was aimed directly at expanding the supply of wheat and other
grains.
A second policy effort was designed to improve the quantity and
quality of information regarding the export demand for U.S, grains. By
direction of Congress, USDA instituted an export sales reporting
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system at the start of 1974. Although not fully implemented until later,
the eystein allowed the government and the public to have more timely
knowledge of U.S. grain purchases by foreign countries.
As the 1974 growing season throughout the Northern Hemisphere got
underway in the spring, the initial projections (in March 1974) for 1974-
75 production indicated sharp increases in world wheat and coarse grains.
This was based on the large increase in planted acreage, particularly in
the U.S., and it assumed normal yields. A decline. in USSR wheat output
was based on the assumption that two successive years of high yields was
unlikely. Indian wheat production for 1974 was expected to be lower. On
balance, most of the gain in wheat and coarse grain production was expected
to occur in the U.S., with crops in the rast of the world showing small.
changes.
The expectation for a sharp expansion in production, marginal in-
creases in trade, and a major replenishment of stock levels in 1974-75
was upset by the major weather-induced shocks to production which occurred
later in the year.
The 1974 growing t,eason was a disaster for U.S. grain production.
The impact was greatest on spring sown craps, particularly corn and soy-
beans, Briefly, three events -- a cold wet spring, a hot dry summer, and
a wet harvest -- combined to drastically reduce crop yields and produc-
tion, Total wheat production actually expanded as a result of larger
acreage, but spring wheat yields were sharply lower.
As these events developed in the U.S., declines in wheat production
became apparent in the USSR, Canada, India, Argentina, and Australi-s.
r
- 39
Further, the Sahelian drought was in its sixth year. While the region
and its population alone were not of sufficient size to greatly affect
the world food balance, the growing global awareness of the suffering
was an important contributing factor to the perception of the danger of
a large-scale world food emergency in 1974.
As a consequence of all those factors, the world grain supply-
demand outlook made another dramatic shift in the last half of 1974.
This is illustrated by comparing USDA's assessments of the world grain
balance in March and October of 1974. World wheat stocks had been fore-
cast to rise by 11 mmt in March. By October, a decline of 7 mmt in
1974-75 ending wheat stocks was projected. for wheat and coarse grains,
a 26 mmt increase in stocks expected in March had become a 21 mmt decline
in October.
These significant events culminated in the World food Conference
in late 1974. Rapidly deteriorating U.S. domestic crops and ;ospects
of real shortages of wheat, corn and soybeans during the 1974-75 season
led to greatly increased market Activity and heavy foreign purchases
of U.S. commodities. Soviet re-entry into the U.S. grain market in the
late summer and fall of 1974 raised serious concerns over the possibility
of large purchases further tightening available supplies. This resulted
in the negotiation of an agreement that would limit further purchases
in 1974-75; and beginning in 1976-77, the U.S. and USSR put into effect
a five-year agreement governing the level of grain trade between the two
countries.
Globally, world grain production declined sharply from 1973. Wheat
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production fell about 15 smut and coarse grain production declined by 40
mmt. In the case of wheat, production estimates had been lowered throughout
the growing season for several major producing countries -- Canada,
Australia, the U.S. and the USSR. For the USSR, the final 1974 wheat pro-
duction estimate was 16 mmt below the June projection and 11 mmt below
the August estimate. Nearly all of the 40 mmt drop in world coarse
grain production occurred in the U.S. (down 36 mmt).
As the 1974-75 marketing year progressed, wheat prices rose 36 per-
cent from the seasonal harvest low to November of 1974. Following the con-
clusion of negotiations which produced the U.S./USSR Grains Agreement,
prices stabilized, then declined throughout the remainder of the 1974-75
season. However, U.S.. exports of grain remained at high levels, Ending
1974-75 stocks of U.S. wheat rose slightly, while coarse grain stocks
reached record low level.
1975
By early 1975, adjustments to the reduced crop production in the
last half of 1974 had become fairly evident. Initially, it had seemed
that tight supplies and high prices would force sharp reductions in foreign
demand. In fact, aggregate foreign consumption of grain, for both food
and feed, had remained relatively stable. Most of the adjustment to
reduced supplies and high prices had occurred within the U.S.
The first (in April 1975) USDA forecast for 1975-76 world grain pro-
duction-and consumption was in may respects similar to the initial 1974-75
forecast made a year earlier. Indicated planted acreage and assumed
normal weather were expected to produce world wheat and coarse grain crops
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almost Equal to the level forecast in March of 1974. Similarly, identical
forecasts were made for increases in ending stocks of 11 mmt and 25 mmt
for wheat and coarse grains, respectively.
As the 1975 growing season progressed, generally favorable weather
patterns prevailed. The U.S. produced its first wheat crop in excess of
2 billion bushels and a record corn crop. The favorable domestic wheat
prospects resulted in U.S. farm prices reaching the lowest level in two
years at harvest. However, by mid-1975, world wheat prospects began to
seem less favorable. Estimates of the USSR wheat crop were reduced 5
mmt in July and again in August.. With each reduction an equal quantity
was added to projected Soviet wheat import requirements. Thus, during
the late summer and fall of 1975, the world wheat balance again shifted
from a position of production in excess of consumption to the prospect
of production falling short of consumption.
USDA did not have an accurate estimate of USSR grain production un-
til after October 1975. Declining Soviet production prospects were evi-
dent earlier, but the magnitude of the shortfall was greatly underesti-
mated. The massive decline in USSR grain production amounted to 18 mmt
of wheat and 34 mmt of coarse grains. To compensate for these losses,
the USSR imported over 25 mmt of grain. The accompanying charts illus-
trate the behavior of U.S. wheat prices in relation to the pattern of
purchases reported under the export sales reporting system.
1976
In April of 1976, USDA's assessment of upcoming world grain produc-
tion prospects again was optimistic in terms of improved crop output
7.
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and recovery of stock levels. This time, events support this initial out-
look. The high prices of the previous year had encouraged a large in-
crease in global plantings and, barring severely adverse growing ^tonditions,
a major recovery was likely.
Crop prospects remained favorable as the season progressed, and as
harvests in the Northern Hemisphere got underway the surplus wheat con-
dition .,forecast earlier became more evident. By October of 1976, world
wheat production was astimated to increase 44 mmt and stacks were esti-
mated 29 mmt higher in 1976-77 than the year before. Even these estimates
eventually turned out to be conservative. Wheat prices, which had been
relatively stable in the first half of 1976, began to fall following the
harvests and declined steadily throughout the remainder of the year and
into the first half of 1977. Consequently, by Gild of 1976, it became
evident that the recovery in wheat production and stocks had been so large
that prices would remain stable at significantly reduced levels well into
the next crop year unless production was reduced.
1977
In early 1977, wheat prices continued to decline as a result of
large supplies and reduced export demand for U.S. grain, particularly
by the USSR. It was apparent that wheat acreage would be reduced in
1977 in the Northern Hemisphere, especially in the U.S. and Canada.
Southern Hemisphere plantings also were likely to decline later in the
year. Signs of potential improvement in demand were evident from large
Chinese purchases of Canadian, Australian and Argentine wheat for delivery
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in Calendar 1977.
By the time the first Forecast of the 1977-78 world wheat balance
was made in May, evidence of reduced plantings and the likelihood of
lower yields resulted in a moderate reduction in the wheat production
projection. However, crop output was expected to exceed consumption
requirements and raise stock levels. Production declines in China,
t1exico and North Africa were expected to help improve the level of
world trade.
At mid-year, world wheat production prospects still appeared quite
favorable. The USSR was expected to harvest a record crop. This con-
tinual high production estimate was partially offset by increased
projections for world consumption and expanded levels of imports by
China. By August, small reductions in production brought projections
equal to estimated consumption. Over the remainder of 1977, total wheat
production estimates continued to decline, largely as a result of poor
harvesting conditions in the USSR. At the same time, consumption levels
remained high and export prospects continued to improve.
The expectation of significant reductions in stacks helped raise
prices late in 1977. In the U.S., new legislation went into effect
for the 1978 wheat crop. This resulted in acreage restrictions, and the
prospect of a smaller 1978 crop also helped strengthen prices.
i
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V. Influence of Better Production Estimates
on Market and Government Behavior
This section of the report examines how better estimates of world
wheat production in the 1972-77 period could have affected the behavior
of grain markets, the private grain trade, and the U.S. Government. As we
saw in the previous section, the behavior of markets, trade, and ;;overn-
ment are interrelated because of the information availab3e to each and
the government's policy objectives. Between 1972 and 1977, these inter-
relationships led to USDA's decision to reduce acreage controls on grains
in 1973 and to eliminate them completely in 1974; the establishment of
the export reporting system; and the negotiation of U.S,/USSR Grains
Agreement. They also affected the behavior of markets and the grain trade.
In analyzing the impact of new information systems, we must assume
that people who utilize the information believe that the new information
system provides more reliable forecasts of production than alternative
estimation procedures. It is not enough to assume one system is better
than another; people have to believe it is. Furthermore, a given degree
of improvement in production forecasting may have diverse effects on the
behavior of different individuals or organizations. For example, a
certain measure of improvement in the information system may be enough
to influence government policy decisions, but not enough to alter the
behavior of the grain trade.
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A. Com
 arison of USVA and Hypothesized NASA Forecasts
USDA data on forecasts and final production of wheat for the U.S.
and the rest of the world (ROW) for the crop years l s-74 through x.977-
78 are presented in Table 4. The forecast months are April, June,
August, October, December, and February. Final production is based on
data presented after February. These estimates are taken from various
FAS Grain Circulars published regularly by the Foreign Agricultural
Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
USDA did not begin to publish monthly estimates of grain production
in the ROW until 1973. For 1972, October was the first month for which
estimates of ROW wheat production were published. Yet, the 1972-73
marketing year was a critical one; it was the first year the USSR made
large grain purchases from the U.S. In subsequent analyses, we will make
inferences about USDA production estimates from 1972-73 from the results
obtained from the 1973-74 through 1977-78 period.
The reporting months in Table 4 are appropriate for Northern Hemi-
sphere countries. For the Southern Hemisphere, where wheat is planted
in the May-June period, the first relevant estimation month is probably
August. Difference in growing seasons between hemispheres is discussed
later.
USDA publishes production estimates separately for Canada, Australia,
Argentina, W. Europe, the USSR, and the U.S. Estimates of U.S. wheat
production are also issued by the Statistical Reporting Service of USDA.
" oduction in other countries is aggregated into a total estimate. For
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U.S. and Rest of the World Wheat Forecasts 1 ... 73-74 t1gou h 1977-78
- -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - Mmt - R -
„A^ri]^ ,Ju,_ne Aug. Oct. Dec. Feb.i
1973-74 Canada 18.0 - 17.0 17.0 17. 1 17.1 16 .2
Australia 11.0 - 11.0 13.2 11.2 11.9 12.0
Argentina 7.0 - 6.0 5.4 5.4 6.0 6.6
W. Europe 49.0 - 50.0 49.0 50.2 50.5 50.8
USSR 90.0 - 95.0 100.0 105.0 109.7 109.8
Total ROW 298.0 - 301.0 307.8 311.3 320.4 325.9
U.S. 48.0 47.0 46.7 47.0 46.6 46.4 46.4
Total World 346.0 - 347.7 354.8 357.9 366.8 372.3
1974-75 Canada 19.4 16.5 16.2 13.4 14.2 14.2 13.3
Australia 13.2 12.5 11.5 11.0 11.7 11.7 11.4
Argentina 6.3 7.0 7.5 6.5 5.0 4.8 6.0
W. Europe 52.5 53.2 52.8 55.3 55.6 55.9 56.7
USSR 100.0 100.0 95.0 90.0 88.0 83.8 83.9
Total ROW 318.8 317.6 310.4 303.2 301.2 297.1 308.6
U.S. 56.4 56.9 50.1 48.5 48.8 48.8 48.9
Total World 375.2 374.5 360.5 351.7 349.0 345.9 357.5
1975-76 Canada 17.0 16.6 16.3 17.0 17.0 17.1 17.1
Australia 18.7 9.0 10.3 11.0 11.1 11.7 12.0
Argentina 18.7 6.2 7.0 7.7 8.0 8.0 8.6
W. Europe 53.1 51.5 49.9 49.0 48.6 4S.:► 43.5
USSR 95.0 90.0 85.0 85.0 65.0 6500 66.2
'Dotal 8014 317.0 304.4 299.9 300.9 284.0 283.1 292.3
UIS. 57.8 59.5 58.3 58.7 58.1 58.1 58.1
Total World 374.8 363.9 358.2 359.6 342.1 341.2 350.4
1976-77 Canada 18.1 18.1 20.0 23.6 23.5 23.5 23.6
Australia 12.0 11.5 8.0 8.7 10.0 11.6 11.7
Argentina 8.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 12.0 11.0 .11.0
W. Europe 55.8 52.3 50.5 50.2 50.5 50.6 50.7
USSR 95.0 75.0 80.0 90.0 95.0 96.9 96.9
Total ROW 330.4 318.0 320.8 334.7 345.1 348.3 356.8
U.S. 54.4 53.0 55.0 57.9 58.4 58.4 58.4
Total World 384.8 371.0 375.8 392.6 403.5 406.7 415.2
1977-48 Canada 16.3 16.8 16.0 18.4 19.7 19.7 19.8
Australia 13.5 13.0 13.0 11.0 9.2 9.2 9.4
Argentina 7.0 7.0 7.0 6,7 6.0 5.2 5.3
W. Europe 54.3 52.4 51.3 50.4 47.9 47.8 47.7
USSR 100.0 105.0 105.0 95.0 90.0 92.0 92.2
Total ROW 343.5 347.8 342.0 330.7 324.5 325.8 326.4
U.S. 53.5 55.1 55.5 55.2 55.1 55.1 55.1
Total World 397.0 402.9 397.5 385.9 379.6 380.9 381.5
Source; World Grain Situation ,Foreign Agricultural Circular
(Various Issues), U.S. Department of Agriculture.
I^ -
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countries other titan the U.S., the individual countries for which es-
timates are reported account for about 60 percent of the ROW wheat pro-
duction on average. The USSR alone, whose production is highly vari-
able, accounted for an average of about 25 percent of ROW wheat produc-
tion during the historical period under consideration.
We use the mean square error (MSE) adjusted for the number of
observations as a measure of variation in monthly estimates about the
final production estimate. The square root of the MSS %TSL yields
a measure of the standard error of the estimates, assuming there is no
bias in the estimation procedures.
TheriSE for each estimating month calculated from USDA's estimates
are presented in column 1 of Table. 5. As one would expect, errors in
estimation decline as one moves closer to the .final estimate. It should
be noted that improvements in the accuracy of estimates is not achieved
until after the April estimate for most Northern Hemisphere countries.
For Argentina and Australia, estimation accuracy increases after August.
For the Northern Hemisphere, where most of the world's wheat is produced,
the August date is fairly far into the growing season.
An estimation interval corresponding to ±2 standard errors (4 iSb)
is presented in column 2 of Table 5. This interval captures about 95
percent of the variation in the estimates.
To make these results comparable to the estimation procedure
developed by ECON for RASA, we calculate the MSE measure based on
normalized deviations for each year obtained by dividing each estimate
by final production Y The normalization procedure adjusts the production
22.2	 88.8
21.9 87.6 21.6 86.4 10.8 43.2
1919 79.6 19.3 77.2 9.7 38.8
13.1 52.4 16.7 66.8 8.4 33.6
9.7 38.8 13.7 54.8 6.8 27.2
8.2 32.8 9.7 38.8 4.8 19.20 0 0 0 0 0
4.5	 18.0
3.3 13.2 1.2 4.8 0.60 2.4
2.7 10.8 1.1 4.4 0.54 2.16
0.70 2.8 0.94 3.76 0.47 1.88
0.50 2.0 0.76 3.04 0.38 1.52
0.50 2.0 0.54 2.16 0.27 1.08
0 0 0 0 0 0
1.7
	
6.8
1.7 6.8 0.50 2.0 0.25 1.0
1.3 5.2 0.45 1.8 0.23 0.92
0.92 3,68 0.39 1.56 0.19 0.76
0.63 2.52 0.32 1.28 0.16 0.64
0.20 0.80 0.23 0.92 0.11 0.44
0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4	 9.6
2.8 11.2 0.76 3.04 0.38 1.52
1.8 7.2 0.68 2.72 0.34 1.36
0.99 3.96 0.59 2.36 0.29 1.16
0.22 0.88 0.48 1.92 0.24 0.96
0.19 0.76 0.34 1.36 0.17 0.68
0 0 0 0 0 0
i
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Table 5
Rgliability of Wheat Production f9r@casts Under tit
t	 Current Information S stem and Two Alternative NASA Methods
Current
Information
	 6 Percent NASA	 3 Percent NASA
M L Int ry i	 ,(h{S8 Interval
	 _^, interval
.. 
_ - - 
_ - - mmE 
_ `L	 _ _ - ------
Tots , Non U.S.
April
June
Aug.
Oct.
Dec.
Feb.
April
Canada
April
June
Aug.
Oct.
Dec.
Feb.
April
Argentina
June
Aug.
Oct.
Dec.
Feb.
April
June
Australia
June
Aug.
Oct.
Dec.
Feb.
April
June
4
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Table 5 cont'd.
Reliability of Wheat Production Forecasts Under the
Current Information S stem and Two Alternative NASA Methods
Current
Information 6 Percent NASA 3 Percent NASA
interval MSE Interval Of ISS_ Interval
W. Europe - - - - - - - - - - - - mint - - - - - - - - - - - -
April 4.8	 19.2
June 3.4	 13.6 3.4 13.6 1.7 6.8
Aug. 2.4
	 9.6 3.1 12.4 1.5 6.0
Oct. 1.5
	
6.0 2.6 10.4 1.3 5.2
Dec. 0.54	 2.16 2.2 8.8 1.1 4.4
Feb. 0.35	 1.4 1.5 6.0 0.76 3.04
April 0	 0 0 0 0 0
USSR
April. 20.7 82.8 - - - -
June 21.8 87.2 6.0 24.0 3.0 12.0
Aug. 12.7 50.8 4.7 21.6 2.7 10.8
Oct. 12.7 50.8 4.7 18.8 2.3 9.2
Dec. 3.0 12.0 3.8 15.2 1.9 7.6
Feb. 0.74 2.96 2.7 10.8 1.35 5.4
April 0 0 0 0 0 0
U.S.
April 4.2 16.8 - - - -
June 4.5 18.0 3.6 14.4 1.8 7.2
Aug. 1.3 5.2 3.2 12.8 1.6 6.4
Oct. 0.42 1.68 2.8 11.2 1.4 5.6
Dec. 0.11 0.44 2.3 9.2 1.1 4.4
Feb. 0 0 0 0 0 0
April 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total World
April 23.3 93.2 - - - -
June 25.3 101.2 25.2 100.8 12.6 50.4
Aug. 21.0 84.0 22.5 90.0 11.3 45.2
Oct. 13.3 53.2 19.5 78.0 9.8 39.2
Dec. 9.8 39.2 15.9 63.6 8.0 32.0
Feb. 8.2 32.8 11.3 45.2 5.6 22.4
April 0 0 0 0 0 0
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data for long-run trends.
The remaining columns in Table 5 present the MSE for the NASA 6
percent and 3 percent estimation procedures. The 6 percent case corre-
sponds to estimation accuracy of one standard error of ±6 percent.
This is equivalent to achieving the LAOIE 90/90 goal of having an es-
timation procedure that is 90 percent accurate 90 percent of the time.
According to this method, there are steady improvements in the accuracy
of estimates over time, The 3 percent case corresponds to an alternative
procedure assumed by NASA which is roughly twice as accurate as the
6 percent approach.
As can be seen from Table 5, the NASA 6 percent case does not yield
unifoY•^►ly better estimates than the current USDA method based on
normalized data. For total non-U.S. production, the estimates for
Tune and August are slightly better using the NASA method, but those
for subsequent months are not. However, the NASA 3 percent case results
in estimates that are uniformly better than USDA's method by nearly 50
percent in many months.
The results presented so far for alternative estimation procedures
for total ROW wheat production may differ from that obtained for individual
countries. The USDA estimation procedure is based on a combination of
crop estimation forecasts developed and made available by other countries
and direct observations by USDA personnel and other people. Access to
crop estimates or direct observations of conditions vary greatly among
countries. Such information is good for major free world producing coun-
tries, especially in the larger developed countries. However, access
I 
A
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to information is very restricted in the Communist countries of Eastern
Europe, 
the 
USSR and the PRC-	 F
The NASA system, oil the other hand, is based largely oil satellite
observations of relevant data influencing wheat production. Theoretical-
ly, such an approach should result in the same basic degree of fore-
casting accuracy for each country and is not heavily dependent upon the
availability of national production estimates or the.
 ability to personal-
ly observe crop conditions throughout the growing season.
Tile importance of this point Is made clear by comparing the USDA
and proposed NASA estimation procedures for specific countries.
- Canada: NASA 6 percent is batter than the USDA current system
early in the crop year, but is less accurate after August.
- Argo tina: NASA 6 percent is uniformlly better than, USDA
t	 estimates starting in August.
- Australia: NASA 6 percent is better than USDA through
December, but less accurate thereaftor.
- W. Europe: USDA est^matcs are more accurate than NASA 6
percent after June.
- USSR: NASA 6 percent method is much superior to USDA through
October.
- U.S.: Af ter Jana, USDA as timates are superior to those frofil
NASA 6 percent.
The astimation errors for the USSR in the current system dominates
those for ROW. The 4-ITISM for the USSR is nearly equal to that for all
o. the ROW. Justification for the NASA estimation system may turn out
i
t
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to be based heavily on its performance for the USSR and other centrally
planned countries where information based on direct observation of crop
conditions is scanty.
B. Price Behavior with More Accurate
Wheat rroduction Estimates
Any analysis of the effect of more accurate world wheat production
estimates on prices must take into account the extent to which improved
Information is used by the various groups whose response directly or
indirectly influences market prices. In this context, direct market
participants include producers, processors, exporters and speculators;
the major indirect participant with a significant influence on market
price behavior is the government.
For direct market participants, the dissemination of improved
information should tend to equalize the level of that information among
various groups. That is, a larger number of producers would have greater
access to improved information, even though it may not be used efficient-
ly. It is assumed that the relative increase in information available
to producers is greater than the incremental increase to other market
participants, who previously had formalized information systems. This
should allow a more balanced (Lut possibly still une qual) level of in-
formation for groups participating in world grain markets.
For governments, the impact of improved information on world wheat
production estimates is dependent upon policy changes with respect to
production and trade. Two policy decisions were extremely important
t-
-5a-
at the start of the 1972-77
 
period. One was the decision of the USSR to
adjust to its crop shortfall by importing substantial quantities of
grain rather than reducing domestic consumption. As noted previously,
there were early indications of policy changes which_ implied the poten-
tial for increased trade. However, it is still questionable whether
better estimates of USSR wheat (and coarse grain) production in 1972
would have resulted in an accurate forecast of grain imports.
The other policy variable was U.S. production controls. hate in
1972, the USDA relaxed, but did not completely remove, acreage restric-
tions for 1973 crops. Had more accurate estimates of world wheat produc-
tion and trade been available, it is possible that production controls
would have been completely removed for the 1973 U.S. crop. This could
have resulted in an expansion of 15 million acres in wheat plantings
instead of the 5 million acre increase actually planted.
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that the estimate of a
Soviet grain production shortfall and a relatively accurate forecast
of the substantial increase in grain imports would have been Predicted
as early as June 1972 and that the U.S. would have completely abandoned
supply control measures for crops to be harvested in 1973. These two
factors	 a timely accurate assessment of the world grain balance and
a policy initiative to remove acreage controls -- would probably have
had a major impact on world wheat markets. In terms of the extent
of use of improved global wheat production information by the U.S.
government, these actions would represent the maximum level, of utiliza-
tion.
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The actual supply and utilization for wheat in the 1972-73 through
1977-78 period are presented in Table 6. Revised estimates based on
improved information are given in Table 7. Monthly and season average
prices corresponding to these two alternatives are shown In Table 8.
Both the historical data and the improved information scenario
for wheat reflect the substitution of wheat and coarse grains in
production and consumption. In many major producing areas, wheat and
coarse grains can be grown on the same land, and the relative importance
of each depends upon their relative prices. Further, wheat is used as
a feed grain, especially in Europe and the USSR. In many developing
countries, coarse grains are used directly for food and can substitute
for wheat. The data presented for wheat include the effects on wheat
consumption and prices of changes in the coarse grain supply-demand
situation In each year.
The immediate Impact of improved information on wheat production
would have been to raise U.S. wheat prices during the 1972 winter wheat
harvest. Such a development would have led to a more even distribution
of prices during the 1972-73 marketing year. Under these conditions,
an important Source of political criticism of the USSR wheat sales would
have been blunted, i.e., from farmers who sold their wheat early in 1972-
73 at season-low prices and before the full extent of Soviet grain pur-
chases were known. The USDA is an important source of marketing infor-
mation and advice to farmers. Had improved estimates of wheat production
been available and allowed a more accurate assessment of the world
supply-demand balance, the information disseminated by the. various USDA
Ending Stocks	 651	 695	 500	 730	 1,152	 1,201
Beginning Stocks 983 651 695 500 730 11152
Productions 1,546 2,018 1,782 2,122 2,142 2,026
Imports 1 3 3 2 3 2
Total Supply 2,530 2,622 2,40 2,624 2,875 3,180
Feed/Other 147 139 60 63 125 191
Food 530 531 540 559 560 669
Seed 67 90 92 99 88 80
Total Domestic 744 760 692 721 773 84
Exports
Total Disappearance
1,135
1,879
1,217
1,977
1,288
1,980
1 173 950
1,723
1-1124
1,96^
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Tabld 6
U.S. Wheat Supply-Demand_ Balances_
1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78
Planted Acreage (Mil) 54.9 59.3 71.0 74.8 80.2 75.1
Harvested Acreage (Mil) 47.3 54.1 65.4 69.4 70.8 66.5
Yield (Bu/Acre) 32.7 31.6 27.3 30.6 30.3 30.6
-	 -	 - -	 -	 - - million bushels- -	 - -	 -	 -	 -
Beginning Stocks 983 597 340 435 665 1,112
Production 11,546 1 0711 1 0 782 2,122 2 0 142 2,036
Imports 1 3 3 2 3 2
Total Supply 2$531 =;3TT '1,3 5 560 -M 3,150
Feed/Other 201 128 39 35 68 183
Food 530 542 541 588 588 586
Seed 67 84 92 99 92 80
Total Domestic --ff9- 794 672 `722 748 -7W
Exports
Total Disappearance
1 135 1 217
3;'
1 019
T;G^6
1 173 950
TWI
1 124
Ending Stocks 597 340 435 665 1 9 112 1,177
Table 7
Estimated U.S. Wheat Supply- Demand Balances With Improved Information
1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1 ^77-•78
Planted Acreage (Mil Acs) 54.9 70.0 71.0 74.8 80.2 74.8
Harvested Acreage (Mil Acs) 47.3 64.0 65.4 69.4 70.8 66.2
Yield (Bu/Acre) 32.7 31.5 27.3 30.6 30.3 30.6
- - - - - - - - - million bushels - - - - - - -	 - - - - -
Table 8
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U.S. Wheat Prices Received by Farmers;
Actual and Estimated with Improved Information
Season
June July Aug. Set. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. March	 r l r	 nv r
- 
_ - _ - - - (dollars pe bushel) - -	 _ _- - - ..
1972-73
Actuai 1.33 1.32 1.51 1.73 1.89 1.97 2.38 2.38 1.97 2.06 2.15 2.15 1.76
'Estimated 1.45 1.70 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.35 2.35 2.25 2.20 2.15 2.15 1.97
19
Actual. 2.43 2.47 4.45 4.62 4.22 4.20 4.78 5.29 5.52 4.96 3.98 3.52 3.95
Estimated 2.43 2.47 2.70 2.90 3.10 3.50 3.50 3.70 3.90 3.80 3.60 3.52 3.00
1974-75
Actual	 3.57 4.04 4.24 4.32 4.85 4.87 4.65 4.11 3.95 3.65 3.69 3.47 4.09
Estimated
	
3.57 4.04 4.24 4.32 4.40 4.40 4.35 4.10 3.85 3.55 3.50 3.40 4.01
1975-76
Actual	 2.92 3.33 3.89 4.11 4.02 3.58 3.41 3.43 3.66 3.65 3.50 3.43 3.56
Estimated	 2.92 3.40 3.89 4.11 4.02 3.58 3.41 3.43 3.66 3.50 3.35 3.20 3.55
1976--77
Actual	 3.46 3.33 2.97 2.88 2.59 2.46 2.39 2.43 2.47 2.43 2.37 2.19 2.73
Estimated	 3.00 2.90 2.60 2.30 2.30 2.35 2.35 2.40 2.40 2.35 2.25 2.15 2.52
1977-78
Actual	 2.03 2.04 2.13 2.16 2.30 2.46 2.47 2.53 2.59 2.67 2.82 2.82 2.31
Estimated	 2.03 2.04 2.13 2.30 2.45 2.46 2.47 2.53 2.59 2.67 2.82 2.82 2.35
services would have been considerably different. Similarly, other
information sources important to farmers, such as farm publications
and other media services, very likely would have counseled against early
marketing of crops following the harvest.
Since feed use of wheat is a significant source of wheat disappearance
when prices are low, particularly early in the marketing year, higher
4
J=4
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wheat prices would have reduced the amount of wheat fed by an estimated
54 mil. bu. in 1972-73. Assuming exports and domestic food use unchanged,
ending stocks for the 1972-73 season would have been 54 mil. bu. larger.
As a result, an earlier rise in prices would have reduced total demand
and moderated the sharp decline in ending stocks. The season average
price received by farmers (weighted by marketings) would have been higher --
$1.97 per bu. compared with the actual average price of $1.76 per bu.
The decline in wheat prices during the spring of 1973 has associated
with an early (April) USDA forecast of increased world wheat production
for the 1973-74 season. This was based on indications of larger planted
area and normal yields. By mid-1973, there were indications that produc-
tion increases would be more moderate. However, in August USDA was still
forecasting large increases in wheat output For the major producing coun-
tries. In fact, USDA's estimates of world wheat production continued
to rise throughout the 1973-74 crop year.
During this period, in spite of larger production, export demand
tended to be underestimated. This was due partly to a desire by coun-
tries to rebuild depleted stocks and partly to speculative buying asso-
ciated with a general rise in commodity prices. As a result, farm
level wheat prices rose from $2.15 per bu. in May 1973 to a high of $5.29
per bu. in January 1974.	 1
Had USDA's early season estimates of world wheat production been
closer to the actual final estimate, it probably would have dampened
some of the speculative demand, but it might not have had a significant
impact on import demand generated by stock replenishment. USDA's final
estimate of world wheat production in 1973-74 was 25 mmt above its August
- 63.-
estimate.
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What would have made a great impact, however, was the large increase
in U.S. wheat production that would have resulted from a complete abandon-
ment of acreage control programs. As discussed above, this action would
have been a direct result of a more timely and accurate assessment of
the 1972-73 supply-demand balance.. It is estimated that farm prices would
have averaged approximately $3.00 per bu, instead of $3.95 per bu. The
seasonal price changes also would have been less extreme than those that
actually occurred.
As discussed in Section IV, 1974 was a disastrous year for both
wheat and feed grain production. Because of the substitution effect
between wheat and feed grains, very high coarse grain prices helped support
the price of wheat.
USDA forecasts of world wheat production declined by nearly 25
mmt between the April and June estimates and the December assessment.
Upward revisions of production in Southern Hemisphere and some developing
countries placed the final estimate of 1974-75 production at 8 mmt
above the December 1974 estimate.
The effect of an improved information system during tho 1974-75
season probably would have beer. limited to a slight lowering of average
prices and a less pronounced seasonal rise. These small differences in
prices would have resulted from;
- Larger supplies at the start of 1974-75 (increased stocks
carried over from the previous season); and
More timely estimates of the deterioration in world wheat
and feed grain crop conditions.
4.
z
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Wheat production in the USSR was overestimated by 10 mmt in August
1974. A more accurate estimate probably would have given a strong in-
dication of larger wheat (and feed ,grain) imports. Increased supplies
of wheat in 1974-75 could have permitted additional. U.S, wheat exports
of about 270 mix.. bu. This larger exportable supply would have moderated,
``
	
to some degree, the rise in wheat and feed grain prices and probablyF
permitted a slightly larger wheat carryover at the end of the year.
Prices during the 1974--75 season probably would have averaged about $.OR
i
per bu. lower (two percent). Also, the season high prices during
October-November 1974, probably would have been lowered by approxi-
mately $.45 per bu.
In the 1975-76 season, USDA's August estimate of global wheat
production was only 8 mmt above the final outcome. However, estimating
accuracy varied widely among countries. The early projections of the
USSR wheat and feed grain crops turned out to be disastrously low. As
late as October 1975, the USDA was still estimating Soviet wheat produc-
tion at 85 mmt, about 20 mmt above actual production. At the same
time, wheat production in many other countries was significantly
understated.
The sharp drop in Soviet grain production was known or suspected
by many grain trade sources during the growing season. The implied
sizeable grain import requirements led to a sharp rise in wheat prices
during the July-September 1975 period. USDA's ultimate revision of
USSR grain production (in November 1975) merely confirmed the private
assessment made several months earlier.
7
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Under those circumstances, it is doubtful that an improved crop
estimation system would have provided significantly more information
to the wheat market that was already available, although it would have
enhanced USDA's early season assessments. As a result, the behavior
of wheat prices under an improved information system would not have
been much different from the historical experience. More accurate
USDA estimates of the Soviet grain situation probably would have resulted
In prices rising somewhat faster during the summer of 1975. larger
stocks of wheat at the start of the 1975-76 season would not have been
sufficient to moderate prices significantly.
Throughout the 1976-77 season, USDA consistently underestimated
the size of world wheat production. The August 1976 estimate for
world production was 40 mmt too low, including a 17 mmt underestimate
of USSR production. Based on these assessments, market prices declined
throughout the year. The early forecasts of a more moderate increase
in production, followed by continuous upward revisions in world supplies,
resulted in the unusual pattern of wheat prices at yearly highs during
harvest and declining steadily over the remainder of the season.
More timely and accurate estimates of world wheat production would
have led to amore rapid decline in wheat prices during the summer of
1976. Prices generally would have averaged lower throughout the 1976-77
marketing year, probably by about 8 percent. Higher domestic use of
wheat for feeding would have occurred as a result of lower prices.
It is doubtful that more precise estimates of the 1976-77 world wheat
balance would have altered USDA's decision to reduce wheat production in
Y	 j
3
7
1977 through the acreage set-aside program.
I
r
	
	 The main source of estimation error In 1977-78 again was crop
production in the USSR. As late as August 1977, USDA was estimating
a Soviet wheat crop of 105 mmt, or 13 mmt above the actual production
level. It is possible that a satellite estimation system may not have
improved the production assessment, since most of the crop shortfall
occurred as a result of unfavorable weather at harvest time. However,
if a significant part of thr,: deterioration in Soviet wheat production
could have been forecast by late August, it would have affected the
seasonal price behavior. But the fundamental supply-demand balance
for the 1977-78 season would not have been altered, since wheat supplies
were adequate to meet domestic and export demand.
Season average wheat prices would have been only a fe -w cents per bu.
higher under an improved information system, primarily as a result of
a somewhat more rapid rise in prices during the fall of 1977. Wbeat
prices remained high at the end of the 1977-78 season. Prices were
supported by a continuation of the acreage set-aside program for the
following year and by the establishment of a grain reserve, which
insulated wheat supplies from the market. These program decisions,
applicable for the 1978 wheat crop, would not likely have been greatly
affected by more timely and accurate assessments of the, previous year's
production.
Footnote
1/Economic Benefits of Improved Information on Worldwide Crop Produc-
tion, ECQN, Princeton, N,J., November 15, 1976, pp. 8-14.
j
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VI. Benefits and losses from Im roved Information
The impact of improved information on world wheat production could
I
occur fro. two interrelated sources. First, to the extent that more
accurate and timely estimates of wheat production improves the assess-
ment of the global supply-demand balance and this information is widely
disseminated, market price determination should be enhanced. That is,
when participants on each side of the market-- buyers and sellers --
have access to accurate supply information, prices at which commodities
trade should more accurately reflect the underlying supply--demand balance.
And second, the improved information allows positive adjustments to be
made in supplies, This results when governments take policy actions
based on improved information. During the 1972-77 period, the major
USDA policy rosponse would have been an earlier removal of acreage
restrictions.
As discussed in Section V, market price behaviors would have been
altered with improved information. Except for the 1972-73 and the
1977-7a wheat marketing years, average prices received by farmers would
have been lower. Within each year, wide swings in prices would have
been moderated. The altered price behavior would have constituted one
source of the economic impact to producers. Another would have been
adjustments in the volume of wheat marketed. It is estimated that,
under an improved information system, wheat markets would have increased
in two of tte six crop years considered. Three years would have shown
no significant change. And in one year (1972-73), marketings would
have been reduced.
Available data on seasonal marketingpatterns by farmers indicate
that these patterns have changed. Wheat farmers still sell the bulk
of their production in the first three months of the season; however,
the trend is toward more balanced marketings throughout the year. It
has been assumed that a new information system would not have signifi-
cantly accelerated this trend. Therefore, no attempt was made to ad-
just seasonal marketing patterns when calculating alternative levels
of returns to producers,
The procedure used to compare the returns to wheat producers
under an improved information system with the actual conditions during
1972-77 was based upon the total: quantity of wheat disappearance in each
market year. Total disappearance was weighted by monthly farmer mar-
ketings and multiplied by the alternative monthly average prices. These
values were added to arrive at total returns for each year. A simpler,
but less accurate, comparison would have been made by estimating the
value of production only. However, this would have ignored the effects
of changes,_) in stock levels that occurred during the period. While the
method used does not precisely calculate farm receipts, the principal
objective was to compare the difference in returns to farmers from an
improved information system. It was believed that the teu:.nique used
would closely approximate the alternative levels of returns.
Producer returns in 1972-73 would have increased under the improved
system by about $300 million (Table 9). This would have been the re-
sult of a more rapid rise in pricer during the early part of the season
- 69 -
when marketings were heaviest. This wo ►sld have offset a small reduction
in demand. In 1973 -74, the improval information would likely have
generated returns about $1.18 billion lower. This also would have been
a price effect, since marketings would have been unchanged. The im-
proved information would have led to an abandonment of set-aside pro-
grams and moderated the sharp rise in prices during the fall and winter
of 1973-74.
The greatest benefits to farmers would have occurred during the
1974-75 marketing year, when producer returns would have been $950
mil. greater. The impact of improved information on prices would have
had only a marginal moderating effect. However, had the improved in-
formation system been in effect since 1972, the acreage production and
stock adjustments that would have occurred prior to 1974-75 would have
allowed a greater supply available to meet the global grain shortage.
In the following year, the improved system would have had a small
negative impact on producers' returns, due to slightly lower prices late
in the 1975-76 season when farmer marketings are small. With the bumper
global wheat crop in 1976-77, improved information would have resulted
in significantly lower average prices with only a marginal rise in
demand. Producer returns would have been $400 million lower. For the
1977-78 season, the principal effect would have been a somewhat stronger
post-harvest price rise in Lhe fall. This would have increased producer
returns by about $40 million.
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l
Alternative Returns to U.S. Wheat Producers Under
the Prevailing and Improved Information Systemsr
S sue► terns
Marketing Prevailing Improved
Year System System Chi
-------------- ,million dollars--------------
1972-73 3,408 3,703 +295
1973-74 7,760 5,934 -1,826
1974-75 69995 7,949 +954
197576 6,770 6,729 -41
1976-77 4,736 4,347 -389
1977-78 4,589 4,632 +43
Total 34,258 33,294 -964
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Table 9
B. Consumer Ben efits
The major benefit to U.S. consumers would have been lower and more
stable prices for bread, flour, and other wheat products. However,
since less than one-third of U.S. wheat production is consumed domes-
tically as food, the direct benefits due to lower food prices would have
been small.. .(clad the improved information system been evaluated for
feed grains as well as wheat, it would show a much larger benefit to
consumers in the form of lower food prices and expenditures. This
is because feed grain prices would also have been lower on average,
and production larger, due to earlier cancellation of set-aside pro-
grams. This in turn would have resulted in larger production of and
lower prices for livestock, poultry, and dairy.)
Assuming that the estimated changes in farm prices were passed
directly through to consumers, the only significant differences in
FF ^^
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aggregate food costs would have occurred in 1972-73, 1973-74, and
i
	
	
1976-77. The cost of wheat products would have been $110 million
higher in 1973-73, but this would have been more. than offset by re-
ductions of $500 million and $100 million in !;W­74 and 1976-77,
respectively.
In terms of the costs of specific good items, the price impact
would be imperceptible. For example, in the yaar of the greatest
impact on wheat prices, 1973-74, the reduction in cost of a 10-1b.
bag of flour would have been only 22 cents. The reduction in the
cost of a loaf of bread (one lb.) would have been 1.4 cents.
These estimates assume no changes in marketing and processing
margins under the improved information system. A case might be
made that the greater stability in wheat prices could have slowed
the rise in margins. (For example, flour milling margins doubled
during 1972-73.) however, since the period also experienced infla-
tionary pressures from rising energy costs and instability in other
ingredient prices such as shortening and sugar, it is likely that
any impact on marketiti and processing margins would have been negli-
gible.
C. Exports
A greater impact would have occtrred in the value of U.S wheat
exports under the improved information system (Table 10). In each year except
1974-75, the changes would have occurred as a result of prices, because
x
	 quantities exported, except in 1974-75, would have been unchanged.
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Table 10
Changes in the _Export Value of U.S. Wheat
Under the Improved Information System
Marketing
Year (Million Dollars)
1972-73 +193
1973-74 -1,168
1974-75 +942
1975-76 -47
1976-77 -199
1977-78 +23
Total
-256
Export value estimates were based on estimated changes in .farm
level prices. Since the volume of grain shipped would have been the
same in each year, export basis prices can be assumed unchanged. How-
ever, since seasonal export patterns differ from farmer marketing
patterns, sample average prices were used instead of weighted average
prices.
The higher price rise early in the 1972-73 r.-ason finder the im-
proved information system would have increased export earnings during
this year. The improved system, if it had been in effect, would very
likely have led to an earlier elimination of the wheat export subsi-
dies in effect then. This would have lowered government costs and
reduced exporter revenues during the season. In 1973-74, the lower
(and more stable) prices would have resulted in sharply lower export
revenues. That would have been partially offset the following year,
when the higher export volume would have accounted for larger export
igs. In the 1975-76 and 1977-78 seasons, the improved system
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would have resulted in only marginal changes in export earnings. How-
ever, in 1976-77 export earnings would have been reduced even further
under the improved system.
It is difficult to assess the impact of the improved wheat pro-
duction esttziiating system on grain exporting farms because information
on their factual operations during the 1972-73 through 1977-78 period
are not available.
To the extent that some of these firms had more accurate informa-
tion on world wheat production and trade than was available to Chi.,
market generally, they were in a position to make large profits. How-
ever, they also .faced substantial market risk due to the extremely vo-
latile prices during the period examined. The costs incurred for
grain exporting firms in dealing with volatile prices may, in some
years, have been equal to or greater than the advantages gained from
timely information.
The improved information system analyzed in this report would
probably reduce any information advantage grain exporting firms
have over the rest of the market and, thus, the potential profits
derived from such an advantage. At the same time, prices would have
been less volatile and market.risks lower. Thus, it is not clear
what the net effect of the better information system would hive
been on the profits of grain exporters.
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VII. Policy Implications for the U.S.
A crop estimation system based on satellite technology could improve
the functioning of U.S. and world grain markets and U.S. policy formulation
and implementation. Although a reliable production estimation system pro-
vides only half of the necessary information to assess the global supply-
demand balance, it is the first and, in most instances, the most important
step.
From the U.S. perspective as the major producer/exporter and as the
country which provides the major adjustments in stocks in times of imbalance,
timely accurate estimates of global grain supplies would allow improved
assessments of the supply-demand balance and enhance the policy formulation
ability of the U.S. government. These improvements are discussed below.
A. Improved Estimation of Effort Demand
The new crop estimation system would lead to a substantial improvement
in production estimates for the centrally planned countries. These nations
are major grain producers and importers, and the USSR is a major source of
instability in world grain production. More timely and accurate estimates
of wheat (grain) production for that country alone would lead to improved
demand projections and to more stable behavior of markets if this informa-
tion were generally available.
Currently, the U.S. relies heavily on the five-year (U.S./USSR) Grains
Agreement, now in its third year, to stabilize grain trade between the two
countries. The USSR is required to buy at least 6 mmt of grain per year
(egnally divided between wheat and feed grains) and can buy 8 Hunt without
prior consultation. The Soviets may buy more, depending on U.S. grain
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supplies and approval by the U.S. government. During 1977-78 and 1978--79,
the USSR has been allowed to buy up to 15 aunt of grain because U.S. And
world supplies were adequate.
Typically, the upper limit of purchases allowed by the U.S. has not
been determined before October, when U.S. supplies are known with a high
degree of certainty and a reasonably good estimate of USSR production is
available. Even so, the actual level of USSR grain purchases for the
coming year remains uncertain. Since the October date is more than one-
quarter of the way through the U.S. wheat marketing year, the present
arrangement still leaves a great deal of uncertainty about USSR grain needs
during a period when fanners market a substantial portion of their produc-
tion and are making critical, decisions concerning the next year's crop.
A more accurate estimate of USSR and other countries' wheat production by
the beginning of August would improve the market price determination process
and improve allocation of supplies through the marketing year. Also, as
outlined below, it would enhance farmers's decisions about the next crop.
B. Production and Price Policies
USDA must make a decision on set-aside programs for wheat by early
August to guide farmers' winter wheat planting decisions. (A similar
decision for feed grains is made in early November.) This program deter-
mination is made before firm estimates of world wheat production are
available, particularly for the USSR and Eastern Europe among the
Northern Hemisphere countries. If USDA had more accurate estimates of the
world wheat situation before it had to make acreage set-aside decisions for
t
^k
4
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wheat, it would reduce the risk of making a wrong decision -- either
allowing for too little U.S. production in the year after a poor world
wheat crop or too much U.S. production after a year of large world crop
production.
The U.S. has established a farmer-owned, long-term grain reserve as
a way to help stabilize U.S. and world grain prices. There are now
slightly over 400 mil. bu. of wheat, about 730 mil. bu. of corn, and
nearly 125 mil.. bu. of other feed grains in this reserve. Farmers are
paid to hold reserves, but they become available to the market when
prices reach specified levels. Market prices are determined by a
combination of production, demand, and government program decisions.
Better production estimates could lead to improved management of the
long-term grain reserves. Anticipation of poor world grain crops would
help ensure a relaxation of set-aside programs for the coming year. If
reserves were reduced in the current year as a result of poor crops,
larger production in the following year would help ensure adequate supplies
to rebuild reserves. Thus, improved Estimation of world grain production
could help guarantee that reserves are not depleted. This is especially
important for wheat, as discussed above, since U.S. production decisions
for next year must be made before the size of the current year's level of
world wheat production may be known with a high degree of certainty.
Also, it is costly to hold large grain reserves. The determination
of their size has been based in part by existing crop estimation procedures.
It is possible that improvements in estimation procedures could reduce
'F
	the size and, therefore, the costs of required reserves.
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C. Policies to Improve Information
This report assumes that better wheat production estimates via a
satellite system would be publicly available. All countries would benefit
I
	 from the estimates, including both those who have bu4 do not share infor-
mation about their crop conditions and those who do not have timely
production estimates. Demonstrating the value of better production
estimates could have two salutory effects. It might encourage centrally
planned countries to share information on their own crops on a more timely
basis. Any advantage they currently gain from not sharing this informa-
tion would be eroded with a reliable system based on satellite
estimations; therefore, these nations would have less reason for not
malting public estimates of their own crop sizes. The availability of
ground-based estimates as a supplement to satellite estimates would
probably improve the overall estimation procedure.
And second, countries that currently have poor crop estimation
procedures might be induced to improve them if they realize the benefits
of better estimates. Information available to them from satellite
technology would supplement ground-based estimation procedures, and it
might require less of an investment in the latter than would be required
without a satellite component..
D. Structure of the Grain Trade
We argued earlier in this report that the concentration of firms in
international grain trade grov,^, out of the economies of scale in informa-
tion. It follows, therefore, that better information about world production,
publicly available, would reduce the advantages of scale economies that now
accrue to a few firms and that a larger number of firms would participate
in the international grain trade.
It was also argued earlier that grain markets are generally com-
petitive, even though international grain trade is dominated by a few
large firms. There is no guarantee, however, that the competitive
character of brain markets would be maintained if there were further
concentration ir, the grain export business. To the extent that better
production estimates allowed easier entry into the grain trade, it would
help work against the development of a noncompetitive market t3trueture.
